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I. INTRODUCTION 
Net neutrality is the principle that Internet service providers (“ISPs”) or 
broadband service providers (“BSPs”) must treat all data on the Internet equal-
ly.1 Under the principle of net neutrality, ISPs and BSPs are not permitted to 
discriminate or charge differentially by user, content, site, platform, applica-
tion, type of attached equipment, or modes of communication.2 However, there 
has been a substantial amount of controversy over whether net neutrality 
should be imposed as a regulatory requirement.3 This issue has been particular-
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 1 See Dan Helling, Net Neutrality and Preserving Freedoms of the Internet, 6 LAW & 
SOC’Y J. UCSB 51, 53–54 (2007). 
 2 See id. at 53–54, 58; see also Net Neutrality 101, SAVE THE INTERNET, FREE PRESS, 
http://commcns.org/MQbKm1 (last visited Feb. 13, 2014). 
 3 Emily R. Roxberg, FCC Authority Post-Comcast: Finding a Happy Medium in the 
Net Neutrality Debate, 37 J. CORP. L. 223, 233–34 (2011) (discussing Comcast Corp. v. 
FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). See generally THE PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., 
NET NEUTRALITY OR NET NEUTERING: SHOULD BROADBAND INTERNET SERVICES BE REGU-
LATED (Thomas M. Lenard & Randolph J. May eds., 2006); Davina Sashkin, Failure of 
Imagination: Why Inaction on Net Neutrality Regulation Will Result in a De Facto Legal 
58 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS [Vol. 22 
ly contentious in the United States where the Federal Communications Com-
mission (“FCC” or “Commission”) has begun to impose net neutrality re-
quirements that focus on whether the FCC has jurisdiction to regulate broad-
band services.4 
Net neutrality continues to be a controversial issue with powerful advocates 
both in favor and against the imposition of net neutrality requirements. The 
FCC and net neutrality advocates have argued that the failure to impose net 
neutrality requirements could limit the content to which subscribers and con-
sumers wish to gain access.5 In a situation without net neutrality requirements, 
some argue that the service provider may have an incentive to provide cheaper 
and better access to its own content versus a third party’s content as it will 
provide a competitive advantage.6 To remedy this issue, net neutrality advo-
cates have argued for government intervention to prevent such discrimination.7 
Additionally, implementation of the net neutrality principle has been very con-
troversial8 because consumers are already protected by existing regulations.9 
Furthermore, any requirements regarding the provision of specific content 
could be viewed as a violation of the First Amendment.10 The controversy has 
also been based on the fact that some opponents of net neutrality argue that the 
FCC does not have the jurisdiction to regulate broadband.11 
                                                                                                              
Regime Promoting Discrimination and Consumer Harm, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 261 
(2006). 
 4 In re Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, Report and Order, 
21 F.C.C.R. 17,905, 17,906 (Dec 21, 2010) (requiring telecommunications and information-
technologies providers to operate with the goal of keeping the Internet open) [hereinafter 
Open Internet Order]; see also Jennifer Wong, Net Neutrality: Preparing for the Future, 31 
J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 669, 680 (2011) (“In 2005 . . . the FCC pursued its 
first enforcement of net neutrality principles.”). 
 5 Open Internet Order, supra note 4, at 17,908–09. 
 6 See Helling, supra note 1, at 55 (“For example, if an ISP strikes up a deal with 
Google and not with smaller search engines, such as WebCrawler, Google’s searches could 
be pre-set to open faster than the smaller search engines on your computer, ultimately limit-
ing the individual’s choice and fair market competition.”). 
 7 Open Internet Order, supra note 4, at 17,909, 17,911. 
 8 See Christopher R. Steffe, Why We Need Net Neutrality Legislation Now Or: How I 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Trust the FCC, 58 DRAKE L REV. 1149, 1159 (2010) (“The 
current debate regarding network neutrality involves primarily two groups: (1) those who 
believe the principle of network neutrality should be legislated; and (2) those who wish to 
continue to allow the FCC, which has traditionally enforced the basic principles of the In-
ternet, to enforce net neutrality.”). 
 9 See Wong, supra note 4, at 702-03 (“Many opponents of regulation also believe that 
current laws and free market forces already amply protect consumers from the hypothetical 
doomsday scenarios posed by net neutrality.”). 
 10 Christopher E. Roberts, Can I Still Google My Yahoo? Reframing the Net Neutrality 
Debate—Why Legislation Actually Means Deregulation, 77 UMKC L. REV. 765, 779 
(2009). 
 11 See Steffe, supra note 8, at 1164–65. But see Aaron K. Brauer-Rieke, The FCC Tack-
les Net Neutrality: Agency Jurisdiction and the Comcast Order, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
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Despite FCC action in this area, early court cases have been unclear con-
cerning the FCC’s jurisdiction to fully implement net neutrality type-
restrictions.12  However, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir-
cuit on January 14, 2014, determined that the FCC had not, in its recent net 
neutrality rulings, cited to any statutory authority that would “justify its order 
compelling a broadband provider to adhere to open network management prac-
tices.”13 
Furthermore, Congress has not been single-minded about whether the FCC 
should be afforded express jurisdiction to remedy net neutrality concerns.14 
Accordingly, Congress has considered a number of bills that would either pro-
vide the FCC with clear net neutrality authority or prohibit the FCC from act-
ing in this area.15 With the recent D.C. Circuit ruling on net neutrality, it is 
                                                                                                              
593, 607–08 (2009) (“The Commission cited six separate provisions to support its Title I 
ancillary authority: section 1 of the Communications Act, section 201 of the Communica-
tions Act, section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, section 256 of the Telecom-
munications Act, section 257 of the Telecommunications Act, and section 601(4) of the 
Telecommunications Act.”). 
 12 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
1002–03 (2005) (deferring to the FCC, because the questions resolved “in the order under 
review involve[d] a ‘subject matter [that] is technical, complex, and dynamic’”); Comcast 
Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding against the Commission, because the 
“Commission has failed to tie its assertion of ancillary authority over Comcast’s Internet 
service to any ‘statutorily mandated responsibility’”). 
 13 Verizon v. F.C.C., No. 11-1355, 2014 WL 113946, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 14, 2014) 
[hereinafter Net Neutrality Decision]. 
 14 Edward Wiet, A Ruling Could Support F.C.C.’s Net Neutrality Defense, N.Y. TIMES 
BLOG (May 20, 2013, 5:53 PM), http://commcns.org/1kGeLUw (“Justice Antonin Scalia 
wrote that in cases where Congress has left ambiguous the outlines of a regulatory agency’s, 
‘the court must defer to the administering agency’s construction of the statute so long as it’s 
permissible.’”). 
 15 See, e.g., Internet Freedom and Nondiscrimination Act of 2006, H.R. 5417, 109th 
Cong. (2006) (attempting to amend the Clayton Act with respect to competitive and nondis-
criminatory access to the Internet); Communications Opportunity, Promotion, and En-
hancement Act of 2006, H.R. 5252, 109th Cong. (2006) (proposing to create a national 
franchise for video providers, and additionally addresses net neutrality, e911, and municipal 
broadband); Network Neutrality Act of 2006, H.R. 5273, 109th Cong. (2006) (proposing 
that it is the policy of the United States to, among other things, maintain the freedom to use 
broadband telecommunications networks, including the Internet, without interference from 
network operators. Outlines specified duties of broadband network providers to ensure 
broadband network neutrality, including the duty to: (1) enable users to utilize their broad-
band service to access all lawful content, applications, and services available over broad-
band networks, including the Internet; and (2) not block, impair, degrade, discriminate 
against, or interfere with the ability of any person to utilize their broadband service for 
lawful purposes. Provides exceptions for providers, including implementing reasonable 
measures to manage its networks and protect network security. Provides for implementation 
and enforcement of this Act through the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)); 
Communications, Consumer’s Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of 2006, S. 2686, 
109th Cong. (2006) (Introduces Title ix – Section 901 on Internet Neutrality: 
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likely the FCC will soon consider next steps on net neutrality. 
Both proponents and opponents of net neutrality have omitted from their de-
bate an important and clear jurisdictional basis for the FCC to implement net 
neutrality requirements: the Basic Agreement on Trade in Telecommunications 
Services (“BATS”) of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).16 Under the 
United States’ commitment to the BATS, the United States has the treaty obli-
gation to implement many net neutrality principles for broadband services, 
including transparency, and fair and non-discriminatory interconnection for 
broadband services.17 While the BATS is not self-executing18 by the FCC,19 the 
                                                                                                              
Sec. 901. Neutral networks for consumers. 
(a) IN GENERAL- Beginning 1 year after the date of enactment of this 
Act, the Federal Communications Commission shall report annually to 
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and 
the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce for 
5 years regarding— 
 (1) the developments in Internet traffic processing, routing, 
peering, transport, and interconnection; 
 (2) how such developments impact the free flow of infor-
mation over the public Internet and the consumer experience using the 
public Internet; 
 (3) business relationships between broadband service provid-
ers and applications and online user services; and 
 (4) the development of and services available over public and 
private Internet offerings. 
(b) DETERMINATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS- If the Com-
mission determines that there are significant problems with any of the 
matters described in subsection (a) the Commission shall make such 
recommendations in its next annual report under subsection (a) as it 
deems necessary and appropriate to ensure that consumers can access 
lawful content and run Internet applications and services over the public 
Internet subject to the bandwidth purchased and the needs of law en-
forcement agencies. The Commission shall include recommendations 
for appropriate enforcement mechanisms but may not recommend addi-
tional rulemaking authority for the Commission. 
Communications, Consumer’s Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of 2006, S. 2686, 
109th Cong. (2006). 
 16 WTO, Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services, S/L/20 (Apr. 
30, 1996), 36 I.L.M. 366 (1997) (granting the FCC the power to make “such rules and regu-
lations . . . as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of . . . any international radio or 
wire communications treaty or convention”). 
 17 Id.; see also WTO, Telecommunications Services: Reference Paper, Negotiating 
Group on Basic Telecommunications (Apr. 24, 1996), available at 
http://commcns.org/1eZhXqF. 
 18 See Self-Executing Treaty Definition, LEGAL INFO. INSTITUTE, CORNELL UNIV. LAW 
SCHOOL, http://commcns.org/1dMWgVY (last visited Feb. 13, 2014) (A self-executing 
treaty is defined as a treaty that becomes judicially enforceable upon ratification. As op-
posed to a non-self executing treaty, which becomes judicially enforceable through the 
implementation of legislation. A treaty could be identified as either self executing or non-
self executing by looking to various indicators, including statements that are made by Con-
gress or the Executive regarding the treaty, indeterminate language of the treaty, or if the 
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FCC has the legal jurisdiction to implement the BATS under § 303(r) of the 
United States Code.20 Accordingly, as discussed below, not only does the FCC 
have the legal authority to implement net neutrality regulations under the 
BATS,21 the United States has committed itself to its implementation, because 
BATS is a treaty.22 As the FCC will likely take further action to justify its net 
neutrality actions, BATS, coupled with § 303(r) of the Communications Act, 
provides the FCC with a solid jurisdictional basis for such actions.23 
II. NET NEUTRALITY 
Net Neutrality is best understood as an equal platform where Internet users 
can choose the applications and services they wish to use, as well as the con-
tent they want to access, create, or share with others.24 Advocates have stated 
that rules on net neutrality are necessary to protect innovations on the Internet 
and to preserve the kind of openness that has allowed the Internet to flourish.25 
                                                                                                              
treaty deals with a matter within the exclusive law-making power of Congress, indicating 
that Congress must create implementing legislation.). 
 19 Charles M. Oliver, WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services and FCC 
Implementation, 15 COMM. LAW. 13 (1998). 
 20 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (2006). 
 21 Oliver, supra note 19, at 13. 
 22 ROBERT CARR ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT: U.S. PERFORMANCE IN 
SELECTED MAJOR MARKETS, at 1-2 (Office of Studies, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Pub. 3150, 
1998). 
 23 Although we will explain further in the course of the article, Section 303(r) has been 
utilized consistently by the FCC as a basis for implementing treaties that the United States is 
a party to. For instance, in implementing the United States commitments made in treaties 
negotiated and agreed to under the ITU, the FCC utilizes Section 303(r) of the Communica-
tions Act as the basis of jurisdiction. Similarly, the FCC has relied on Section 303(r) to 
implement its WTO commitments in the past and continues to utilize the rules it adopted as 
part of this implementation. To date, there have been no challenges to the FCC’s authority 
to implement treaties in its discretion. In fact, many of its licensees, such as wireless service 
providers, rely on and have commitments in their licenses or are required to comply with 
international law requiring compliance with international treaties. Therefore, we believe that 
the FCC has solid jurisdictional basis for such actions. 
 24 CONSUMER & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS BUREAU, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CONSUM-
ER GUIDE: THE OPEN INTERNET (2013), available at 
http://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/openinternet.pdf.  For a fuller discussion about 
net neutrality regulation in the United States, see Barbara Van Schewick’s report. BARBARA 
VAN SCHEWICK, NETWORK NEUTRALITY & QUALITY OF SERVICE: WHAT A NON-
DISCRIMINATION RULE SHOULD LOOK LIKE 16, 18 (Stanford Law Sch. Ctr. for Internet & 
Soc’y, unnumbered working paper, 2012). See also David W. Opderbeck, Does the Com-
munications Act of 1934 Contain A Hidden Internet Kill Switch?, 65 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 31–
32 (2013); Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 581 (2010) (“We can 
now see that future telecommunications and broadcast networks will all be based on Inter-
net-like data networking technologies.”); Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of 
Communications Law, 55 UCLA L. REV. 359, 362–63 (2007). 
 25 VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 25, at 16 (“Network neutrality rules . . . impose some 
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Likewise, net neutrality advocates believe that network neutrality restrictions 
are critical to ensure that service providers are unable to block access to lawful 
applications provided by ISPs and BSPs or to downgrade their data streams.26 
These advocates also believe that net neutrality is necessary to preserve the 
Open Internet and its resulting benefits.27 
In order to accomplish these objectives, the FCC has focused on implemen-
tation requirements that would lead ISPs and BSPs to freely allow users to 
send and receive all lawful content, use all lawful services and applications, 
and also use all lawful devices that do not damage the network.28 Regarding 
access, the FCC has encouraged ISPs to allow consumers to access all net-
work, service, content, and application providers.29 In addition, the FCC has 
announced Internet principles that declare that ISPs or BSPs “cannot prevent 
users from accessing the lawful Internet content, applications, and services of 
their choice, nor can they prohibit users from attaching non-harmful devices to 
the network.”30 
To advance these goals, the FCC has adopted three basic Open Internet 
rules: transparency; no blocking; and no unreasonable discrimination.31 These 
rules were recently struck down by the D.C. Circuit with respect to the treat-
ment of common carriers.32 The purpose and intent of the FCC’s Open Internet 
                                                                                                              
constraints on the evolution of the network in order to allow the Internet to continue to 
foster application innovation, preserve user choice or foster democratic discourse.”). 
 26 Id. at 14. 
 27 Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Prepared Remarks at the 
Brookings Institution: “Preserving a Free and Open Internet: A Platform for Innovation, 
Opportunity, and Prosperity” 3 (Sept. 21, 2009), available at http://commcns.org/1g3kPkl. 
 28 David W. Opderbeck, Does the Communications Act of 1934 Contain A Hidden 
Internet Kill Switch?, 65 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 3–4 (2013). 
 29 Genachowski, supra note 28, at 4. 
 30 Id. at 4. 
 31 The three basic Open Internet rules are: 
 1. Transparency: Broadband providers must disclose infor-
mation regarding their network management practices, performance, 
and the commercial terms of their broadband services; 
 2. No Blocking: Fixed broadband providers (such as DSL, ca-
ble modem or fixed wireless providers) may not block lawful content, 
applications, services or non-harmful devices. Mobile broadband pro-
viders may not block lawful websites, or applications that compete with 
their voice or video telephony services; 
 3. No Unreasonable Discrimination: Fixed broadband provid-
ers may not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting lawful network 
traffic over a consumer’s broadband Internet access service. The no 
blocking and no unreasonable discrimination rules are subject to limited 
exceptions for “reasonable network management. 
Open Internet Order, supra note 4, at 17,906. 
 32 Net Neutrality Decision, supra note 13, at 4 (“Because the Commission has failed to 
establish that the anti-discrimination and anti-blocking rules do not impose per se common 
carrier obligations, we vacate those portions of the Open Internet Order.”). 
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rules are to guarantee that the Internet continues to be the stage for innovation 
and job creation.33 The FCC’s rules empower consumers and entrepreneurs.34 
The rules also protect free expression, promote competition, and increase cer-
tainty in the marketplace by providing greater predictability for all stakehold-
ers regarding federal policy in this area.35 Finally, the FCC’s Internet rules spur 
investment both at the “edge,” and at the core of broadband networks.36 
In its adoption of these rules, the FCC has emphasized that at no point 
would the adoption result in content regulation.37 The FCC recognized the First 
Amendment issues that would arise if content regulation were addressed.38 
Instead, the FCC focused on ensuring that the purpose of the Open Internet 
rules was to clarify high-level, flexible rules of the road for broadband to en-
sure that neither the government nor the companies that provide broadband 
service could restrict innovation on the Internet.39 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF NET NEUTRALITY 
The wireless broadband market in the United States, like other countries, is 
fairly limited in terms of competition.40 Therefore, competition is a critical 
                                                
 33 Genachowski, supra note 28, at 4. 
 34 Open Internet Order, supra note 4, at 18,043. 
 35 Id. at 17,906. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 17,982, 17,985. 
 38 Id. at 17,981–85. 
 39 Id. at 17,906–07; see also Barbara S. Esbin, A Point of View: Net Neutrality Regula-
tion in the United States, PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND.: PROGRESS SNAPSHOT (RELEASE 
4.21), Oct. 2008, at 1, available at http://commcns.org/1mfc3qX (discussing the history of 
net neutrality). 
 40 In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to 
Commercial Mobile Services, Sixteenth Report, 28 F.C.C.R. 3700, 3728 (Mar. 21, 2013). 
The United States telecommunications market for broadband services, especially on the 
network side, is characterized by limited competition. See also Competition and Regulation 
in a Converged Broadband World, Int’l Telecomm. Union (Feb. 2013), available at 
http://commcns.org/1osM9yt (This report was prepared by Dr. Christian Koboldt of 
DotEcon Limited, under the direction of the Telecommunication Development Bureau 
(BDT) Regulatory and Market Environment Division (RME). This report is part of a new 
series of ITU reports on broadband that are available online and free of charge at the ITU 
Universe of Broadband portal. The FCC, in this Report provides a detailed assessment of 
competitive market conditions across the entire mobile wireless sector, particularly broad-
band.). In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to 
Commercial Mobile Services, Sixteenth Report, 28 F.C.C.R. 3700, 3728 (Mar. 21, 2013). 
Currently, “the four nationwide service providers (AT&T, Sprint Nextel, T-Mobile and 
Verizon Wireless), which, by the end of 2011, accounted for just over 90 percent of the 
nation’s mobile wireless subscribers (including wholesale connections and machine-to-
machine connections), with AT&T and Verizon Wireless together accounting for 64 per-
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concern to policy makers.41 Accordingly, consumers who must rely on obtain-
ing broadband access through BSPs or ISPs have raised concerns about access 
to these limited networks.42 Net neutrality proponents allege that telecommuni-
cations companies that supply broadband access may seek to impose a tiered 
service model in order to control their network pipeline.43 This action may limit 
competition for broadband services, create artificial scarcity, and force sub-
scribers to buy uncompetitive services.44 Net neutrality proponents argue that 
this limitation discriminates results in certain websites not being made availa-
ble to consumers – a form of discrimination.45 
Proponents of net neutrality include a broad range of interests.46 For exam-
ple, Internet giants Google, Facebook, and Amazon, who depend on access to 
the networks of competitors, are the biggest supporters of net neutrality.47 To-
day, net neutrality also finds powerful support in government, beginning with 
President Obama himself, who has stated that the adoption of the FCC’s net 
neutrality rules will preserve the free and open nature of the Internet, while 
“encouraging innovation, protecting consumer choice, and defending free 
speech.”48 President Obama reiterated his support for the Open Internet rules, 
                                                                                                              
cent.” In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to 
Commercial Mobile Services, Sixteenth Report, 28 F.C.C.R. 3700, 3732 (Mar. 21, 2013). 
These service providers have increased their subscriber base and now “cover in excess of 91 
percent of the U.S. population in large proportions of the western, mid-western, and eastern 
United States.” In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with 
Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, Sixteenth Report, 28 F.C.C.R. 3700, 3737 (Mar. 
21, 2013). 
 41 ROBERT D. ATKINSON, THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., THE ROLE OF COMPE-
TITION IN A NATIONAL BROADBAND POLICY 1 (2007), available at 
http://commcns.org/1jDAYT5. 
 42 Lawrence Lessig & Robert W. McChesney, No Tolls on The Internet, WASH. POST, 
June 8, 2006, at A23. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. (“[Network owners] would be able to sell access to the express lane to deep-
pocket corporations and relegate everyone else to the digital equivalent of a winding dirt 
road.”). 
 45 Brendan Sasso, Google, Facebook, Netflix Defend Net Neutrality Rules in Court, 
HILL (Nov. 16, 2012), http://commcns.org/LYYVFl (“The supporters of the [Open Internet] 
rules say [that] all websites should be treated equally, whether they are large corporate 
services or small personal blogs.”); see Lessig & McChesney, supra note 41 (“Without net 
neutrality, the Internet would start to look like cable TV. A handful of massive companies 
would control access and distribution of content, deciding what you get to see and how 
much it costs.”). 
 46 Sasso, supra note 44 (noting that some of the major supporters of net neutrality in-
clude “Amazon, Dish Network, eBay, Facebook, Google, Netflix, Sony[,] and Twitter”). 
 47 Marguerite Reardon, Amazon, Facebook, and Google Back FCC on Net Neutrality, 
CNET (Oct. 19, 2009), http://commcns.org/1btY5wG. 
 48 President Barack Obama, Statement on Today’s FCC Vote on Net Neutrality (Dec. 
2014] An Overlooked Basis of Jurisdiction for Net Neutrality 65 
when Julius Genachowski resigned as FCC Chairman in 2013.49 Other support-
ers of net neutrality include consumer advocate and human rights groups, such 
as Free Press.50 
Opponents of net neutrality, including Verizon and the Cato Institute, claim 
that the imposition of net neutrality regulations would degrade broadband ser-
vices or freeze them at the status quo, because the regulations would discour-
age innovation.51 Many opponents, such as the large wireless service providers 
and cable operators believe the marketplace is the correct venue in which to 
allow the issue of net neutrality to be decided; not the regulatory arena.52 Some 
opponents of net neutrality argue that net neutrality is a violation of the net-
work providers’ property rights.53 
Other opponents of net neutrality argue that prioritization of bandwidth is 
                                                                                                              
21, 2010). More specifically, President Obama stated that: 
Today’s decision will help preserve the free and open nature of the In-
ternet while encouraging innovation, protecting consumer choice, and 
defending free speech. Throughout this process, parties on all sides of 
this issue – from consumer groups to technology companies to broad-
band providers – came together to make their voices heard. This deci-
sion is an important component of our overall strategy to advance 
American innovation, economic growth, and job creation. As a candi-
date for President, I pledged to preserve the freedom and openness that 
have allowed the Internet to become a transformative and powerful plat-
form for speech and expression. That’s a pledge I’ll continue to keep as 
President. As technology and the market continue to evolve at a rapid 
pace, my Administration will remain vigilant and see to it that innova-
tion is allowed to flourish, that consumers are protected from abuse, and 
that the democratic spirit of the Internet remains intact. 
Id. 
 49 President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on Julius Genachowski (Mar. 
22, 2013) (“Because of [Chairman Genachowski’s] leadership, we have expanded high-
speed [I]nternet access, fueled growth in the mobile sector, and continued to protect the 
open Internet as a platform for entrepreneurship and free speech”). 
 50 Major U.S. Consumer Groups Support FCC Action on Net Neutrality, FREE PRESS 
(Oct. 21, 2009), http://commcns.org/1exFUR3. In his letter to FCC Chairman Julius 
Genachowski, Craig Aaron, senior program director at Free Press states: 
The fight for Net Neutrality is often mistakenly portrayed as a clash of corporate interests. 
That’s simply not the case. Certain companies may oppose Net Neutrality or sow unfounded 
fears about what the FCC is doing, but consumer groups and public advocates are united in 
their support for an open Internet. The FCC should not be deterred by the phone and cable 
industry’s attempts to muddy this debate with myths, misdirection and manufactured out-
rage. We need strong and clear Net Neutrality rules now to safeguard the Internet’s future. 
Id. 
 51 Robert Pepper, Network Neutrality: Avoiding a Net Loss, TECHNEWSWORLD (Mar. 
14, 2007), http://commcns.org/1jeqyG7. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Kelsey Zahourek, Net Neutrality Infringes on Private Property Rights, PROP. RTS. 
ALLIANCE (Sept. 21, 2011), http://commcns.org/1gdPy07. 
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necessary for future innovation on the Internet.54 These opponents argue that 
BSPs should have the ability to provide preferential treatment in the form of 
tiered services.55 For example, a network service provider, such as a wireless 
service provider, could give data-transmission priority to those companies that 
pay a premium, which will “give an advantage to the most important or most 
profitable [Internet] traffic.”56 The opponents explain that the added revenue 
received from such services could be used for the building of increased broad-
band access to more consumers.57 These advocates have also expressed that net 
neutrality regulation would have adverse consequences for innovation and 
competition in the market for broadband access by making it more difficult for 
network providers to recover their expenditures in the broadband networks.58 
IV. THE FCC’S OPEN INTERNET ORDER 
On December 21, 2010, the FCC adopted the Open Internet Order.59  In this 
order, the FCC imposed three requirements on broadband service providers: 
transparency; a prohibition on blocking websites and certain applications; and 
no unreasonable discrimination.60 The transparency rule required a network 
provider to “publicly disclose accurate information regarding the network 
management practices, performance, and commercial terms of its broadband 
Internet access services sufficient for consumers to make informed choices 
regarding use of such services and for content, application, service, and device 
providers to develop, market, and maintain Internet offerings.”61 Under the 
“no-blocking” rule, the fixed broadband provider cannot “block lawful content, 
applications, services, or non-harmful devices.”62 Also under the “no-blocking” 
rule, the mobile broadband provider cannot “block lawful websites, or block 
applications that compete with [the provider’s] voice or video telephony ser-
vices.”63 Further, the network providers are subject to the doctrine of reasona-
ble network management.64 
                                                
 54 See, e.g., JONATHAN D. HART, INTERNET LAW (2007). 
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Finally, the FCC established the “No Unreasonable Discrimination” rule, 
under which broadband providers “shall not unreasonably discriminate in 
transmitting lawful network traffic” to their customers.65 The FCC found that 
network practices are reasonable if they are “tailored to achieving a legitimate 
network management purpose.”66 Legitimate network purposes include: “en-
suring network security and integrity”; contending with “traffic that is unwant-
ed by end users” (for example, parental controls); or “reducing or mitigating 
the effects of congestion on the network.”67 
The FCC issued these rules based on their jurisdiction over communications 
by wire and radio.68 Further, the FCC stated that they were implementing these 
rules based on the specific statutory mandates in the Communications Act as 
amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, including provisions that 
direct the Commission to enhance Internet investment and to protect and pro-
mote voice, video, and audio communications services.69  Specifically, the FCC 
found that Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 directs the 
Commission (along with state commissions) to take actions that encourage the 
deployment of “advanced telecommunications capability.”70 “Advanced tele-
communications capability,” as defined in the Act, includes broadband Internet 
access.71 Under Section 706(a), the Commission is required to encourage the 
deployment of such capability by “utilizing, in a manner consistent with the 
public interest, convenience, and necessity,” various tools, including 
“measures that promote competition in the local telecommunications market, 
or other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure invest-
ment.”72 
Broadband service providers including Metro PCS and Verizon subsequent-
ly challenged this order in court.73  In their joint brief, appellants Metro PCS 
and Verizon argued that the challenged order should be vacated because the 
open Internet rules are unconstitutional under the First Amendment.74 Further, 
the appellants argued that the FCC does not have authority to regulate mobile 
Internet access under the Communications Act.75 The appellants also argued 
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that the Commission cannot impose license conditions because it lacks the 
statutory authority in the first instance to regulate broadband services.76 In ad-
dition, the appellants argued that the Communications Act expressly forbids 
the FCC from applying common-carrier regulation to broadband Internet ac-
cess, so the rules are invalid.77 Finally, the appellants argued that the rules are 
arbitrary and capricious.78 
In light of the Net Neutrality decision, the addition of the BTA as a jurisdic-
tional basis will ensure that the FCC can act, consistent with U.S. law, on im-
posing certain net neutrality restrictions. 
V. A TRUE BASIS OF JURISDICTION: THE WTO BASIC 
AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
SERVICES 
Despite all of the focus on net neutrality, advocates and opponents have both 
overlooked a key jurisdictional basis that would enable the FCC to have clear 
jurisdiction79 over net neutrality. Perhaps even more importantly, the BATs 
requires, the United States to implement certain net neutrality obligations.80 
Since 1998, the United States and over 107 other countries agreed to the 
BATS;81 the most far-reaching trade agreement on telecommunications ser-
vices to date.82 As part of this agreement, the United States had great foresight 
to include within its commitments a broad range of new services and technolo-
gies.83 More specifically, the United States foresaw the coming growth in in-
ternet-based services and committed itself, as did several other countries, to 
cover packet-switched services, among other critical telecommunications ser-
vices.84 Packet switched services are in fact the equivalent of broadband ser-
vices and the United States, during the negotiations, expressly included these 
services to protect its growing IP-based services providers, such as MCI 
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Communications.85 
Because of this commitment by the United States, it is bound to implement 
all of its commitments under the BATS for IP-based services.86 As part of this 
trade agreement, each country is responsible for implementing its commit-
ments.87 In the United States, treaties are the supreme law of the land.88 Further, 
under Section 303(r) of the Communications Act, the FCC has the authority to 
implement treaty commitments without further Congressional authority re-
quired.89  Accordingly, to the extent that the BATS requires net neutrality type-
regulation, the United States is under an obligation to adopt and implement 
such regulation.90  Because of Section 303(r) of the Communications Act, the 
FCC may be that implementing body if it so chooses (no further statutory au-
thority is required).91 
However, Section 303(r) has been utilized consistently by the FCC as a ba-
sis for implementing treaties that the United States is a party too. For instance, 
in implementing the United States commitments made in treaties negotiated 
and agreed to under the international organization, the International Telecom-
munications Union, the FCC utilizes Section 303(r) of the Communications 
Act as the basis of jurisdiction.92 Similarly, the FCC has relied on Section 
303(r) to implement its WTO commitments in the past and continues to utilize 
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the rules it adopted as part of this implementation.93 To date, there have been 
no challenges to the FCC’s authority to implement treaties in its discretion.94 In 
fact, many of its licensees, such as wireless service providers, rely on and have 
commitments in their licenses or are required to comply with international law 
requiring compliance with international treaties.95 
In committing to the BATS, there were certain key principles, which mimic 
those of net neutrality, which the United States committed to implement for 
packet switched services.96  Specifically, the Reference Paper to the BATS, 
which the United States committed to implement, requires the adoption of 
requirements on transparency, anti-competitive practices and fair interconnec-
tion.97 
With regard to transparency, a significant portion of the BATS agreement, 
including the reference paper, is based on transparency.98  The negotiators of 
the BATS agreement recognized early on that transparency was critical in or-
der to enable competition in the telecommunications marketplace.99 
The agreement also requires the adoption of rules that prevent anti-
competitive practices by telecommunications service providers.100  Specifically, 
the BATS provides that: “Appropriate measures shall be maintained for the 
purpose of preventing suppliers who, alone or together, are a major supplier 
from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive practices.”101 
The BATS goes further and specifically identifies anti-competitive safe-
guards that must be addressed. 102   These include: (a) engaging in anti-
                                                
 93 See, e.g., In re International Settlements Policy Reform Joint Petition for Rulemaking 
of AT&T Inc., Sprint Nextel Corporation and Verizon Modifying the Commission’s Process 
to Avert Harm to U.S. Competition and U.S. Customers Caused by Anticompetitive Con-
duct, FCC IB Docket No. 11-80 RM-11322, IB Docket No. 05-254, IB Docket No. 09-10 
(Nov. 29, 2012), 7250-51 (2011); see also Review of Foreign Ownership Policies for Com-
mon Carrier and Aeronautical RadioLicenses under Section 310(b)(4) of the Communica-
tions Act, as Amended, 26 FCC 11703 (2011). 
 94 Mike Ludwig, How Verizon’s Challenge to FCC Net Neutrality Rules Could Silence 
Minority Voices, TRUTHOUT (Sept. 11, 2013, 12:58 PM), http://commcns.org/1gxpBIx. 
 95 In fact, satellite operators are required under Part 25 of the FCC’s rules to engage in 
international coordination consistent with the ITU Convention and other treaties. See e.g., In 
re EchoStar Satellite Operating Co., Application for Special Temporary Authority Related 
to Moving the EchoStar 6 Satellite from the 77º W.L. Orbital Location to the 96.2º W.L. 
Orbital Location, and to Operate at the 96.2º W.L. Orbital Location, Memorandum Opinion 
and Order, File No. SAT-STA-20130220-00023, at ¶ 9 (July 9, 2013), 
http://commcns.org/1btYLlT (discussing international coordination requirements under the 
ITU treaty). 
 96 Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, supra note 17. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
2014] An Overlooked Basis of Jurisdiction for Net Neutrality 71 
competitive cross-subsidization; (b) using information obtained from competi-
tors with anti-competitive results; and (c) not making available to other ser-
vices suppliers on a timely basis technical information about essential facilities 
and commercially relevant information which are necessary for them to pro-
vide services.103 
Accordingly, similar to some of the basic net neutrality principles, the 
BATS requires the imposition of anti-competitive safeguard to prevent anti-
competitive behavior in the telecommunications market.104  Based on this re-
quirement, it is reasonable for the FCC to utilize this commitment to imple-
ment at least the no blocking and anti-discrimination provisions of the current 
net neutrality requirements, among other future requirements. 
The BATS requires fair and non-discriminatory interconnection among tele-
communications suppliers.105 Specifically, the BATS requires that interconnec-
tion is available among telecommunications service networks in order to allow 
the networks of different suppliers to interconnect.106 Further, the BATS re-
quires that interconnection shall be at any technically feasible point and that 
interconnection agreements be made public.107 This provision was agreed upon 
in order to limit the ability of dominant or significant telecommunications 
suppliers to require unreasonable interconnection points and to ensure that 
there is transparency in the interconnection process.108 
Further, the BATS requires that interconnection is provided under the fol-
lowing: Under non-discriminatory terms, conditions (including technical 
standards and specifications) and rates and of a quality no less favorable than 
that provided for its own like services or for like services of non-affiliated 
service suppliers or for its subsidiaries or other affiliates; in a timely fashion, 
on terms, conditions (including technical standards and specifications) and 
cost-oriented rates that are transparent, reasonable, having regard to economic 
feasibility, and sufficiently unbundled so that the supplier need not pay for 
network components or facilities that it does not require for the service to be 
provided; and upon request, at points in addition to the network termination 
points offered to the majority of users, subject to charges that reflect the cost of 
construction of necessary additional facilities.109 
The BATS recognizes that interconnection is a complex process, so it pro-
vides for dispute settlement.110 Accordingly, a service supplier under the BATS 
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requesting interconnection with a major supplier has recourse with an inde-
pendent body at any time or after a publicly-known reasonable period of 
time.111 The key principles underlying net neutrality include transparency, in-
terconnection, and non-discrimination.112 The BATS covers all of these.113 In 
fact, because it is a treaty, the BATS provides the FCC with authority to im-
plement a significant subset of net neutrality principles as rules.114 
Despite its commitment to the WTO reference paper for packet switched 
services, the United States has not implemented these commitments for broad-
band services.115 In fact, there is no indication that the FCC has even consid-
ered this as a basis for jurisdiction.116 This may be in part because no United 
States government body has examined whether these commitments have been 
or should be implemented—the review process consists only of regular annual 
reviews by the United States Trade Representative seeking input on and re-
viewing compliance with other countries’ trade agreement commitments.117 
This is despite express language in Section 303(r) of the Communications Act, 
which permits the FCC to implement treaties.118 Accordingly, the FCC should 
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consider, after appropriate notice and comment, the use of the BATS in adopt-
ing further net neutrality regulations. It provides the United States with a solid 
basis to exercise jurisdiction in this area.119 Furthermore, failure to implement 
the commitments of the BATS for broadband services leaves the United States 
at risk to WTO dispute settlement.120 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Net neutrality continues to be a very controversial area. Both sides have fo-
cused significantly on whether the FCC has the appropriate jurisdiction to act 
in this area.121 Over time, the jurisdictional basis that the FCC has utilized has 
been uncertain and the recent Net Neutrality decision122 has resulted in the 
FCC’s jurisdiction being made uncertain. However, what is certain is that the 
BATS and Section 303(r) of the Communications Act provide the FCC with a 
clear jurisdictional basis for the implementation of net neutrality rules. In fact, 
the United States’ failure to implement these requirements means it is in viola-
tion of its treaty requirements. 
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